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SHOULDN’T CARS REACT AS DRIVERS EXPECT? 
 
Jan-Erik Källhammer,1,2 Kip Smith,2 Johan Karlsson,1 Erik Hollnagel2 
1Autoliv Research, Vårgårda, Sweden 
E-mail: jan-erik.kallhammer@autoliv.com 
2Department of Computer and Information Science 
Linköping University, Sweden 
 
Summary: The objective of this project is to develop and test a multi-method 
empirical approach for predicting drivers’ assessments of the level of 
acceptability of a warning issued in response to accidents, near-accidents, and 
other incidents. The role of humans (drivers) in the pre-crash phase means that 
systems that protect occupants and pedestrians must be seen as distributed, 
cognitive systems. Driver acceptance therefore has to be an important design goal. 
One obstacle to acceptance is the human dislike for false alarms. An approach to 
overcoming driver dislike for false alarms is to focus on driver expectations and 
to design systems to issue alarms when and only when the driver is likely to 
accept them. In this paper we discuss one such approach.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A wide variety of active safety systems currently under development promise to reduce 
significantly the frequency and severity of injuries sustained in collisions. To make progress 
toward the goal of reducing fatalities and accidents on our roads, designers of safety systems 
have focused on the prevention or mitigation of accidents. Issues of automation, system 
accuracy, and user reactions will therefore become major stumbling blocks to the introduction of 
systems for collision warning and avoidance. Since humans (drivers) play an important role in 
the pre-crash phase, systems that protect occupants and pedestrians must be seen as distributed, 
cognitive systems rather than as purely technical systems. Driver acceptance therefore becomes 
an important design goal. Accordingly, knowledge of how drivers and vehicle systems function 
together is critical in achieving a successful design. One hallmark of this interaction is the human 
dislike for false alarms. Indeed, the rate of false alarms may be a key factor for driver acceptance 
of novel active safety systems. Unfortunately, because even highly accurate systems are likely to 
have a high rate of false alarms, they are likely to encounter driver resistance. This generates a 
dilemma for designers of active safety systems. An approach to overcoming the dilemma posed 
by driver dislike for false alarms is to focus on driver expectations and to design systems to issue 
alarms only for conditions where the driver is likely to accept them. In this paper we discuss one 
such approach.  
 
Historically, the goal when designing and developing active safety systems has usually been to 
achieve the highest rate of system accuracy from an engineering perspective. Unfortunately, false 
alarms are the rule when the base rate of the event to be detected is low (Parasuraman, Hancock, 
& Olofinboba, 1997). When false alarms are the rule, people either ignore them or disable the 
system. Because the active safety systems currently under development will not become 100% 
accurate within the foreseeable future, designers and developers face a dilemma: How to design 
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the system so that drivers and society can reap their benefits while minimizing the likelihood of 
rejection due to the innately human dislike for false alarms? 
 
Farber and Paley (1993, cited in Parasuraman et al., 1997) speculate that the ideal detection 
algorithm may provide alarms in conditions that may lead to collision, even though the driver 
will probably avoid the accident. A warning only for situations leading to a traffic accident will 
be very rare. In the US during 2004 there were 38,253 fatal, police-reported motor vehicle traffic 
crashes, 1,862,000 crashes with injuries and 4,281,000 crashes with property damage only 
(NHTSA, 2005). Given that the total vehicle miles traveled was 2,962 billion with almost 199 
million licensed drivers, a fatal motor vehicle traffic crash would be expected once every 5,200 
driver years. Similarly, a crash resulting in an injury would be expected once every 107 driver 
years and property damage crashes once every 46 driver years. A warning only in situations 
leading to any of these crashes would therefore be so rare that it would likely exacerbate the 
already critical situation and make the driver’s reactions hard to predict. Thus, we need to accept 
warnings also in situations that do not always lead to a crash. 
 
Instead of a traditional engineering performance criteria, the goal may equally well be to 
maximize the driver’s expectations of when the system should become active. By conforming to 
driver expectations, the system should be able to achieve a relatively high level of user 
acceptance, and become an effective partner in the driver-vehicle system. Following this 
approach we therefore need to identify in which situations drivers would expect alerts and 
therefore also accept them as relevant and appropriate. In the next section we describe our 
empirical approach to identifying and classifying the types of situations in which drivers are 
more likely to welcome an alarm or intervention from an active safety system. We then discuss 
the first set of results from our study and their implications for designing active safety systems 
that respond when, and only when, drivers do.  
 
METHOD, EXPERIMENT 1 
 
The study was designed to expose a driver to ordinary driving situations that might (not) pose the 
opportunity for an active safety system to issue a warning. After the drive, the driver rated how 
welcome a warning would have been to each of those situations.  
 
Participants and task 
 
Twelve drivers, 3 female and 9 males (age: M 28 yr, SD 2.0, range 23 - 30; driving experience: 
M 9.7 yr, SD 2.2, range 5 - 12) participated in our study. All reported driving relatively old cars 
(M 9.7 yr, SD 4.1) with manual transmissions and without modern safety systems like stability 
control. All but one reported driving at least 10,000 km annually. Four participants had 
corrected-to-normal vision. The volunteers were recruited at the Autoliv plant in Vårgårda 
Sweden, in a rural setting about 60 km from Gothenburg, Sweden.  
 
Task 
 
Each volunteer individually drove an instrumented car alone for a total of approximately three 
hours in normal traffic. Their assigned route presented the driver with a mix of rural, industrial, 
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highway, and urban driving. The route description was provided by a Tom-Tom GO 910 
nomadic navigator with a pre-programmed route. The navigation system’s guidance to the driver 
was provided on a 4” LCD display screen and by a synthesized voice played through the 
vehicle’s audio system. The driver could adjust the audio level with the normal audio controls. A 
GPS-based vehicle tracking device enabled the researchers to track the progress of the vehicle 
over the internet. A cell phone was also provided in case the driver wanted to contact the 
researcher. 
 
The driver was instructed to drive safely and normally and to follow the route indicated by the 
navigator. In addition, they were instructed to push a large red button on the dashboard to flag 
any and all incidents perceived as potentially risky, threatening, or otherwise worthy of 
retrospective analysis. No other instructions were given about when and in which situations to 
push the button.  
 
The instrumented vehicle 
 
The vehicle (a Volvo V70) was equipped with a four-camera Smart-Eye eye tracking system that 
continuously recorded the driver’s gaze direction. Three roof-mounted cameras with a 180 
degree field of view captured the environment and traffic dynamics. Continuous recording of 
these data sets enables an off-line visualization tool to generate a movie of the entire drive with a 
superposed circle representing the driver’s gaze direction. A snapshot is shown in Figure 1. In 
addition, the car’s location (from GPS) and all data sent to the CAN bus were continuously 
recorded.  
 
Procedure and dependent variables 
 
Data collection was split on two days, with the first day consisting of going through the written 
instructions to participants, informed consent, calibration of the eye-tracking device, and general 
familiarization of the vehicle and instrumentation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot from offline visualization tool. Gaze direction  
from eye tracker visualized as circle 
 
The second day started immediately with the driving session. Driving was conducted outside 
rush-hour from about 9 AM to noon. The drive was designed to expose the driver to ordinary 
driving situations that might or might not lead an active safety system to issue a warning. Three 
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triggers were used to define those situations. The first was the driver’s pushing the button on the 
dashboard. Two others were automatic triggers generated by longitudinal deceleration (XAcc) 
and fast brake preparedness (Pedal). These triggers flagged additional situations to complement 
those identified by the driver using the push button. Brake preparedness was derived by 
measuring the time between the release of the accelerator and the activation of a proximity 
sensor attached to the brake pedal. The threshold values of both automated triggers were adjusted 
to produce about 30-40 situations for each driver.  
 
After the drive (and the inevitable Swedish lunch), the driver met with the researchers for 
approximately two hours to conduct a post-drive review of the situations flagged by the three 
sets of triggers (Button, XAcc, Pedal). The review session was conducted as a structured 
interview. The driver watched a video of the drive (showing the image from the roof-top cameras 
and the eye-tracker, as shown in Figure 1) of the 20 seconds before and 10 seconds after each 
trigger. After viewing a video-clip, the driver was asked to rate the level of acceptance of an 
alarm in the presented situation. The values were entered on the computer using a slide bar with 
the continuous scale from 0 (totally unacceptable) to 100 (totally acceptable) shown in Figure 2. 
We have analyzed these ratings to assess the likelihood of driver acceptance of an active safety 
system to actual driving situations.  
 
A system in the car has just provided a warning during this event.
You rate a warning in this situation as: 
0 100
Totally 
unacceptable
Totally 
acceptable
Probably 
acceptable
Probably NOT 
acceptable  
Figure 2. Scale to rate the level of acceptance of an assumed warning 
 
RESULTS 
 
Relative acceptance of warnings by triggers 
 
Half of our volunteer drivers (6 of 12) pushed the button fewer than 4 times during the 3-hour 
drive. This half of our sample apparently did not perceive many situations as worthy of alerts or 
of retrospective evaluation. In contrast, the other half pushed the button more than a dozen times 
and one 34 times. This difference suggests that many in the driving public may be reluctant to 
accept the introduction of automated warning systems. This resistance to systems poses a severe 
challenge to the future of active safety systems and underscores the need for designers to 
understand the (rare) situations in which a warning might be welcome. 
 
The 12 drives recorded a total of 99 button pushes, 189 rapid pedal shifts, and 111 rapid 
decelerations. A between ANOVA for trigger conditions indicates that driver ratings differ 
across the three triggers, F(2, 396) = 78, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons indicate that all three 
differ from each other, with the degree of acceptance greatest for button pushes and least for 
PROCEEDINGS of the Fourth International Driving Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment, Training and Vehicle Design 
13 
rapid pedal shifts. It appears that it may be tricky to develop automatic triggers based purely on 
these data.  
 
Categorization of situations 
 
We iterated several times to develop a parsimonious categorization of the 399 situations captured 
by the three types of triggers. Our original scoring scheme included 19 categories (e.g., animal in 
road, pedestrian, speed bump, intersection). This scheme has been consolidated to the five 
categories shown in Figure 3. This scheme is admittedly arbitrary but is manageable and 
replicable.  
 
Relative acceptance of warnings by situation type 
 
The ratings given to each incident were sorted by situation type (Figure 3) and driver. Each 
driver’s ratings for each situation type were averaged and analyzed using a repeated measures 
ANOVA, where categories are the repeated measure and drivers the blocking variable. This 
procedure controls for differential scale use across drivers. The ANOVA rejects the null 
hypothesis of no difference across categories, F(4, 43) = 4.08, p < .01. A post-hoc comparison 
shows that the ratings given to alerts to pedestrians are significantly different (p < .05) than 
ratings to all other categories except vehicles ahead, and that ratings given to traffic differs 
significantly from ratings to vehicles ahead (p < .05).  
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Figure 3. Categories of incident types with mean ratings 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Method 
 
To generate additional ratings of the relative acceptability of a warning to actual driving 
situations, we assembled a library of 23 representative video-clips from Experiment 1 and 
conducted a table-top test. An independent group of eight volunteers watched all 23 clips and 
rated them using the replay procedure of Experiment 1 and the scale shown in Figure 2.  
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Rankings of characteristic situations 
 
The eight participants in Experiment 2 gave lower ratings to situations triggered by the Button 
than the driver in Experiment 1 who pushed the Button. This difference is likely explained by the 
driver’s recall of the full contextual significance of the event. No such difference was found for 
situations triggered braking and brake preparedness.  
 
Because all eight volunteers rated the same situations, it is possible to rank their ratings (within 
subjects) and to ascertain the degree of their consensus about the relative acceptability of alarms 
across event categories. We found that consensus to be statistically significant (Kendell’s W = 
0.210, p < .01). The data are shown in Figure 4. The average ranking of the situations in this 
library reveals a consensus that alerts issued in response to threats posed by pedestrians are more 
welcome than alerts to the other four types.  
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Figure 4. Average rankings given the 23 situations in  
the library of characteristic situations 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The objective of this project is to develop and test a multi-method empirical approach for 
predicting drivers’ assessments of the level of acceptability of a warning issued in response to 
accidents, near-accidents, and other incidents. The argument for this is that the acceptance of an 
active safety system is likely to improve if the system activates only when the driver finds it 
reasonable. The ultimate objective is to make use of this predictive capacity in an active safety 
system.  
 
Minimizing false alarms is a key to acceptance of active safety systems. The low base rates of an 
accident imply that the posterior probability of a collision given an alarm will also be low, even 
if the sensing system will have a high probability of detection (Parasuraman et al., 1997). Also, 
as most drivers will experience at most a few real accidents in their lifetimes, such low frequency 
of alarms would make drivers’ reactions hard to predict. Driver acceptance has to be an 
important design goal for any collision warning and avoidance systems. The rate of false alarms 
will be key factor for driver acceptance.  
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The ratings by drivers, shown in Figure 3, and the rankings by participants in the table-top study, 
shown in Figure 4, are markedly similar. The correlation between the two data sets is .89. This 
impressively high correlation has auspicious implications. First, it indicates that we have 
converging evidence for the relative acceptability of warnings issued in response to situations 
involving pedestrians and vehicles ahead. Ratings and rankings given to warnings to other 
categories of situations (intersections, traffic, and unexpected stuff) were consistently lower.  
 
Second, the high correlation between the retrospective ratings by drivers who triggered events 
and the rankings by independent volunteers of video-clips of selected events has implications for 
future empirical studies. It implies that table-top tests using video clips of events would likely 
generate responses that would correlate positively with the responses of drivers in cars on the 
road. If this finding receives additional support, it may be possible to simplify considerably the 
testing of active safety warning strategies. Table-top reply sessions could readily compare driver 
responses to simulations of a wide variety of warning strategies and could be conducted with a 
large number of participants. The naturalistic setting afforded by the instrumented vehicle could 
then be used to confirm or disconfirm findings from the table-top sessions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have found converging evidence for the relative acceptability of alerts issued in response to 
situations involving pedestrians and vehicles ahead. These findings can be used to guide the 
development of active safety systems. The increased understanding of alarm acceptance by 
drivers in various situations will be used to develop warning strategies that will likely lead to 
higher driver acceptance and trust in the safety systems. System performance may be optimized 
based on driver acceptance rather than objective performance criteria that do not necessarily 
match the expectations of the drivers. After all, the driver expects the car to react in an 
acceptable way. 
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